Johannes Schmidt

Barrister + Mediator + Arbitrator

Category: Best interests

Travel Applications in Parenting Proceedings

1 July 2026 /

Listen and subscribe: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Amazon Music | Audible

Overview

In this episode, I discuss travel applications. Those are applications by a party to take a child outside of Australia for the purposes of short-term travel.  I also discuss some related passport issues. 

Default position

It’s important to be aware that the default position for a child, who is subject either to an extant parenting order or an application for a parenting order, is that you’re not permitted to remove them from Australia, except pursuant to a court order, or with authenticated written consent of every other person who is party to the extant order, or the extant application. I covered that in some detail in the previous episode, so check that out if you haven’t seen it. 

Travel applications

Travel is important for many Australian families.  We’re quite an isolated country geographically, and many, many of us are immigrants.  Many more are descended from immigrants, and still have ties to family, culture, and language overseas, and want to keep those ties alive for their children.

Because many families have two parents who are descended for migrants, or who are migrants, it’s often a matter of consent to have travel provisions in orders, because both parties are motivated to be permitted to travel, as long as certain conditions are met. In the previous episode, I discussed some considerations for when you are drafting travel orders. 

Sometimes, there are circumstances where one party wants to travel with a child and the other doesn’t consent.  That’s where travel applications come in.

Timing considerations

It’s often very important to turn your mind to timing issues in relation to travel applications, particularly when it’s a discrete application for a particular trip.  You need to factor in the usual lead times, particularly when you’re filing an Application in a Proceeding.  You have to then wait, usually for a mention before a Judicial Registrar who doesn’t actually have the power to determine the travel application.  Then, from that hearing, you then get a listing to a defended interim hearing before an officer who does.  That can cause a significant delay, so factor that in when talking to your client about when they want to travel, and what are realistic timeframes to get a matter on to permit the travel. 

Of course, there are sometimes urgent circumstances that motivate a party to want to travel with children. Say, for example, a child’s grandparent overseas is terminally ill, and is expected to pass away soon.  The parent may really want to take the children to see their grandparent before they pass away.  In those cases, you really need to think about the urgency of the application, and the usual processes to seek for an urgent hearing and an abridgement of time for service apply. 

The Kuebler factors

A travel application is, ultimately, of course, a parenting application, so the court has to consider the child, or the children’s, best interests under Section 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975.  But there are some travel-specific considerations, which emanate from the appellate authorities in relation to travel orders.  The leading authority is Kuebler and Kuebler [1978] FamCA 26.  The Kuebler factors are

  • the duration of the proposed travel;
  • the bona fides of the application;
  • the likely effect on the child of being deprived of time with the other parent;
  • any threats to the child’s welfare; and
  • the degree of satisfaction that the court has that the parent will return the child, as promised. 

Duration of travel

As general propositions, in my experience:

  • a shorter trip is more likely to be permitted than a longer one; and
  • a trip which fits neatly into school holidays is more likely to be permitted than one which sees the child missing school.

In my experience, the ratio of travel time to time the destination can also be relevant. In one matter that I was involved in, the parties lived in a regional town.  The travel time to the nearest international airport was something like 4 – 6 hours, and that, coupled with needing to arrive at the airport 3 hours before departure, the actual flight time to the transit country in Asia, the time in transit, and then the flight time on to Europe, and then more drive time at the other end to get to the town where the extended family lived, meant that the travel time door-to-door was something like 48 hours each way. 

In that case, the father didn’t oppose the mother taking the children overseas.  The fight was over the duration of the trip.  The mother was meant to have the second half of the term holidays, which was the usual 7 – 10 days, depending on how long the school holidays are.  The father said “it’s fine for the mother to travel, as long as she leaves and comes back during her scheduled time with the children.” 

The court took into account that, if that were to have occurred, the children would have spent 48 hours there and 48 hours back, so about 4 days’ travel time, to only have 3 or 4 days in Europe to spend with the extended family. 

The court considered that that would not have been in the children’s best interests, and therefore permitted the longer travel time. 

Bona fides

The court wants to be satisfied that there’s a legitimate purpose for the trip – that it’s not being done for the ulterior purpose of just keeping the children away from the other parent.  

It’s not a reasonableness test, and there’s subsequent authority on that. There’s no requirement that the trip be worthwhile in a utilitarian or economic sense. 

There just needs to be a legitimate purpose, and the court needs to be persuaded that that is why your client wants to travel with the children. 

Effects on the child of deprivation of time with the other parent

This factor will really turn on the specific circumstances of that family. 

For example, if there’s an extant order for the children to have half of the long summer holidays with each parent in a block, and the applicant wants to travel within their 3-week block of the summer holidays, there’s obviously not going to be a deprivation of time with the other parent, because the children wouldn’t have spent time with that other parent then anyway.

But if the travel time overlaps with the other parent’s time, then this might be a more relevant factor.  In my view, it’s a good idea, if it’s that sort of an application, to also, with the travel application, seek orders for make-up time with the other parent.  Be proactive about it, offer that make-up time, and seek an order for it.  That might make the court more likely to permit the travel, knowing that there’ll be make-up time there. 

Threats to the welfare of the child

There might be some specific threats relevant to the case.  For example, if there’s some allegation that some extended family member has abused or molested a child, that might be a specific factor that the other side raises, and that the court considers. 

I haven’t come across a case like that. 

The ones I’ve come across, where there’s been a threat, have been where there’s a DFAT advisory that says do not travel or reconsider your need to travel, because it’s a war zone, or because of terrorist activity, or that sort of thing.  In those cases, it’s really important for your client to put on evidence as to how they’re proposing to manage, and mitigate, that risk.  I have had orders made permitting a client to travel with a child to a reconsider travel destination, because the client had really made plans, with their extended family, of travelling away from the particular terror hotspots, and ensuring that they had escape plans. They had places they could drive to, to get further away, and that sort of thing. 

Degree of satisfaction that the travelling parent will return the child – the Line factors

The court will often require some form of security from the travelling parent.  Typically, that’s in the form of a bond, often paid into the other party’s lawyers’ trust account.  It can also be some sort of encumbrance on title to a real property owned by the travelling parent, and that’s often done by way of lodging a caveat.

The Full Court in Line & Line [1996] FamCA 145 clarified that the purpose of that security is twofold:

  1. to provide sufficient incentive for the travelling parent to return; and
  2. to effectively give the left-behind parent effectively a fighting fund to litigate for the return of the child, if the travelling parent doesn’t return as ordered.

In Line, the Full Court set out a number of considerations to take into account in relation to this Kuebler factor:

  • the ties which the travelling parent has to Australia, which include things like an interest in real property, interest in a business, and familial and personal ties;
  • any motive the travelling parent may have not to return the child to Australia, including conflict between the parties, particularly if that’s conflict in relation to the child or the children;
  • the ties which the travelling parent has to the destination country, including, again, things like an interest in real property, interest in a business, and familial, and personal ties;
  • whether the destination country is a signatory to the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction that’s recognised by Australia – of course, in relation to that, you can just look at the Attorney-General’s website on the Hague Convention, which has an up-to-date list of signatories recognised by Australia; and
  • the financial circumstances of the parties – for example, if the travelling parent is worth $50 million, a $10,000 bond is unlikely to incentivise them to return.

Don’t forget to adduce evidence

If your client is not seeking a specific travel order for a specific trip, but is just seeking a general travel order in a final orders application, don’t forget to address the travel proposal in the trial affidavit.

Remember, counsel is not permitted to make submissions without a basis in evidence.  In any event, if there’s no evidence, the judge will just say, “I’ve got no evidence. I can’t determine this issue.”  

Even if there’s no specific travel proposal, the client will, presumably, have some reason for seeking the travel order, whether it’s that they have family overseas, or they just want to be able to go on holidays.  Whatever the reason, make sure it’s there.

Can the court make a general order without a specific proposal?

There are some authorities that question whether the court can make a general travel order on a final basis in the absence of a specific proposal.  For example, Judge Glass, in Jefferson and Hooper (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1170, said that, in the absence of a specific travel proposal, his Honour couldn’t consider the Kuebler factors and the Line factors, and therefore couldn’t determine the travel application. 

Other judges have taken the opposite view.  Harper J, in Alard & Dinesh [2024] FedCFamC1F 260, considered a general application, and considered that, in the circumstances of that case, there could be no confidence that the parents could agree on any future travel arrangements.  Harper J therefore considered that it was in the child’s best interests to make the travel order, because it was the course that was least likely to lead to further litigation about the child. 

That hearing pre-dated May 2024, so it was the old Section 60CC which applied, and Harper J specifically referred to Section 60CC(3)(l), which was a provision for making a decision which is least likely to lead to further litigation.  

That provision does not have an equivalent in the current version of Section 60CC. In Ballard & Kellam (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 115, Christie J nevertheless applied the same concept, citing Alard & Dinesh, and reached the same conclusion that it was in the children’s best interest in that case, to have final orders which were least likely to lead to further litigation. 

Of course, there’s still the catch-all provision, now under Section 60CC(2)(f), that says the court can take into account anything it considers relevant to the child’s best interests.  Therefore, the course least likely to lead to further litigation is still an argument that’s open to you and to your client in seeking a general travel order. 

Passport considerations

Having a travel order is all well and good, but a travel order does no good if the child doesn’t have a passport.  Without a passport, they won’t be able to leave Australia, and they won’t be able to enter the other country.

It’s important, in my view, to couple a travel application with an application for certain passport-related orders.  The typical sort of orders to consider are:

  • an order compelling the other parent to sign the passport application; and
  • frameworks for:
    • where the passports are to be held; and
    • when they get passed between the parents, including in time to obtain visas and that sort of thing.

For Australian passports, the usual requirement is that any person with parental responsibility has to sign the application.  

It is also possible to seek an order that your client be unilaterally permitted to apply for a passport.  Of course, you need to have evidence that supports that.  The typical things where I’ve seen clients achieve that sort of an order from the court, are where: 

  • the other parent either hasn’t engaged in the proceedings at all, and therefore there’s no confidence that they’ll sign anything; and/or
  • the other parent has persistently breached court orders.

Again, think about those things, put on the relevant evidence.

Is sole decision-making responsibility enough for a unilateral application?

You may also have a case where your client already has an order for sole decision-making responsibility or, if it’s a pre-May 2024 order, sole parental responsibility.  Technically, that is sufficient for them to apply unilaterally for a passport in the absence of another order, because their signature alone will meet the requirement that all persons with parental responsibility sign the application. 

I’m told by many instructors and clients, though, that the passports office doesn’t always fully understand, or isn’t fully aware, of what a sole parental decision-making responsibility order means.

Therefore, it is prudent to seek a specific order which expressly authorises the client to solely apply for the passport, with reference to Section 11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005.

Shams & Alkaios (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 620

1 June 2024 /

Listen and subscribe: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Amazon Music | Audible

In this episode, I discuss the judgment of Judge Glass in Shams & Alkaios (No 2), which is the first published parenting case determined on the basis of the 2023 amendments to Part VII of the Family Law Act.

Overview

As everyone who has anything to do with family law knows, the parliament passed the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 last year, which had a particular focus on Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975.

Since the first Exposure Draft of the bill was released, there has been much discussion about the effects of the amendments.

I was on the record early with a view that the amendments were, for the most part, a simplification and rewording of the same concepts, aimed at making the provisions easier to understand for self-represented litigants, rather than a massive upheaval.  Whether I was right or wrong, my views will forever be freely available online to haunt me in a TEN Fireside Chat with Jacky Campbell.

The amendments took effect on 6 May 2024.  That day, Judge Glass of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) in Melbourne commenced a 3-day parenting trial.  

No doubt many other judges did the same, but Judge Glass has the distinction of delivering the first published judgment applying the amended provisions.

His Honour delivered judgment in Shams & Alkaios (No 2) on 20 May 2024.

It was a fairly straightforward relocation matter where the children had been living with the father in Melbourne, and the mother sought a change of residence for the children to live with her in Queensland.

There’s nothing extraordinary about the facts of the case, but it is the first (and at the time of writing only) published decision based on the freshly amended Part VII.

So, how did Judge Glass consider and apply the new provisions?

Are there drastic impacts as a result of the new simplified objects of Part VII?  

Does the absence of a presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility mean that sole decision-making orders will be the new normal?

Have the section 60CC best-interests considerations changed everything?

Decision-Making

The first thing one sees when looking at the judgment is order 1, which reads:

The parties make joint decisions in relation to all major long-term issues in relation of the Children…

This is the new equivalent to the old order for equal shared parental responsibility, but in language which makes it absolutely clear that the order is about decision-making, and nothing else which might have been read into the term “parental responsibility”.

Of course, absent from the judgment is any discussion of a presumption, as none exists anymore.

Decision-making is now just another aspect of the discretionary assessment of best-interests considerations.

However, in determining the allocation of decision-making (after analysis of the best-interests considerations, which I discuss below), Judge Glass referred to the “encouragement” prescribed by section 61CA, which provides:

If it is safe to do so, and subject to any court orders, the parents of a child who is not yet 18 are encouraged: 

(a) to consult each other about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and 

(b) in doing so, to have regard to the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. 

New s 60B – Objects of Part VII

Judge Glass noted that he was guided by the objects of Part VII, as found in section 60B, but did not otherwise refer to them.

Section 60CC Factors

The new section 60CC is much shorter and simpler than the old one.

The old language of protecting children from harm has been replaced by a focus on the safety of not only the child, but also the child’s carers.

Section 60CC(2)(a) – Arrangements which would promote the safety of the child and carers

Under this factor, Judge Glass traversed the history of the parenting arrangements, what his Honour termed as “generalised assertions” by the mother about the father in relation to abuse and controlling behaviour, allegations of physical violence, and other allegations of family violence.

His Honour also included in this part of the judgment discussion about what in this case was a lack of family violence orders.

On my reading, there was nothing novel in the discussion.  It encompassed the matters which his Honour would have discussed pursuant to the old s 60CC(2)(b) and 3(j) and (k).

His Honour was ultimately not satisfied that the father had caused harm to the children, and was therefore not satisfied that a change of residence was necessary to promote their safety.

Section 60CC(2)(b) – Views expressed by the child

In the familiar way, his Honour discussed the children’s views as relayed by the family consultant.

This is unsurprising, as the wording of the new s 60CC(2)(b) is a truncated version of the old s 60CC(3)(a).

Section 60CC(2)(c) – Developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child

Here, his Honour’s discussion turned to the family consultant’s opinions about the care provided to the children in their primary residence, and the support the children received at home and school.

His Honour also referred to the family consultant’s evidence about potential emotional distress which would be occasioned on the children by a move from their familiar environment and community to a new life in Queensland.

Section 60CC(2)(d) – capacity of each person who has, or is proposed to have, parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs

Judge Glass’s discussion of this factor is reflective of the discussion one would have expected in relation to the old s 60CC(3)(f).

It has the usual themes of parental capacity and insight, child-focus and support of the children’s relationships with the other parent.

Section 60CC(2)(e) – Benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child’s parents and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so

Here, his Honour considered the nature of the children’s relationships with each of the parents and other significant adults, ultimately determining that the children had strong and sound relationships with each parent, which could be sustained despite the geographical distances between them.

Having found earlier that there was no risk to safety, the last seven words of paragraph (e), being “where it is safe to do so” had no work to do in this case.

In the absence of safety concerns, the new s 60CC(2)(d) appears to reflect the old s 60CC(2)(a) and (3)(b), (c) and (d).

Section 60CC(2)(f) – Anything else relevant to the particular circumstances of the child

This new version of the old s 60CC(3)(m) catch-all provision.

His Honour did not discuss any relevant matters.

Conclusion

No doubt, we will see more and more judgments in the coming months, which will show us how various judges in all three Court – Division 1, Division 2, and Family Court of Western Australia, are applying the new provisions.  

In time, we will get further clarification from the Full Court and eventually the High Court.

Based on this first published judgment, though, it looks like we may all be able to relax a little bit about the amendments, as nothing much seems to have changed.  

Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 – Initial Thoughts on proposed amendments to sections 60CC, 61DA and 65DAA

30 January 2023 /

The Federal Government has published an Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (“Bill”).  

If enacted, the Bill would, amongst other things, significantly amend section 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (“Act”) (which section sets out the factors which the Court is required to consider when determining the best interests of a child).

The Bill would also repeal s 61DA (the presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for both of their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility), and section 65DAA (the requirement to consider making an order for equal time or substantial and significant time when the Court makes an order for equal shared parental responsibility).

Whilst I have not had time to fully consider those aspects of the Bill, I have spent a bit of time reading them and comparing them to what they would amend.

I have not yet taken the time to read the other parts of the Bill.

Section 60CC Amendments

Section 60CC sets out the factors which a Court must consider when determining the best interests of a child.

What does it say now?

In its current form, section 60CC is unwieldy.  

It contains two “primary considerations” and 14 “additional considerations” (including a catch-all factor which allows the Court to take into consideration whatever it considers appropriate), many of which overlap, many of which are not applicable to many families, but all of which the Court must consider when determining what Orders are in a child’s best interests.

One of the factors applies only if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child: the child’s right to enjoy their Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture, and the impact of any proposed parenting order on that right.   It is the 9th factor in the list of the 14 “additional considerations”.

Due to the overlap between many of them, I routinely group the section 60CC factors when making submissions in Court as follows:

  • the child’s relationships (4 overlapping factors);[1]
  • the risk of harm (3 overlapping factors);[2]
  • the child’s views;[3]
  • parental capacity, responsibility and involvement (4 overlapping factors);[4] and
  • orders least likely to lead to further proceedings.[5]

I note that the above list does not include the factor which applies only if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child.  For whatever reasons, I have worked on very few matters where this factor was relevant, so it is not something I deal with routinely.

I have worked exclusively in family law for over 11 years (about half that time as a solicitor, and the other half as a barrister).  I find it better and easier to simplify the many factors into 5 essential categories (and, if I recall correctly, I lifted those categories from a judgment many years ago, so I am not the only one who does this).

I can only imagine how difficult it must be for self-represented litigants to understand, and engage with, s 60CC in its current form.

What would the Bill change?

The Bill would dramatically simplify s 60CC, with only 6 factors applying to all children.  

The existing factor which applies only if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child remains in place, but is set out separately from the other factors, which will make it easier to find (and its existence more obvious) for cases where it’s relevant, and which will make it easier to skip where it doesn’t apply.

The generally applicable factors are:

  • what arrangements would best promote the safety of the child and each carer of the child;
  • the child’s views;
  • the developmental, psychological and emotional needs of the child;
  • the capacity of each proposed carer to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological and emotional needs, with particular regard to the willingness of the carer to seek assistance and support in relation to those matters;
  • the benefit to the child of maintaining relationships with both parents, and other people significant to the child where it is safe to do so; and
  • a catch-all.

Almost all of the existing factors are essentially covered (with the notable exception of a requirement in the Bill to expressly consider making orders least likely to lead to further proceedings), but the proposed wording is far simpler and more accessible.

There appears to be an increased focus on safety, but, in my opinion, the change is marginal.  The existing section already requires the Court, when weighing the two “primary considerations”, to give greater weight to the need to protect a child from harm than to the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with each parent.  Same concept, different language.

My gut reaction

In essence, the approach to determining best interests would remain much the same, but the section would become much easier and simpler to understand and apply.

Given the horrific rate of family violence in Australia, any increase in focus on the safety of children and the adults in their lives (however small it may be) can only be a good thing.

On balance, these amendments seem pretty good to me.

Section 61DA Repealed

The Bill would repeal s 61DA.

What is s 61DA?

Section 61DA provides that, when making a parenting order, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for the parents of the child to have equal shared parental responsibility (“ESPR”).

The presumption does not apply when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent, or another person who lives with that parent, has committed child abuse or family violence.

The presumption can, in any case, be rebutted by evidence which satisfies the Court that it would not be in the child’s best interests for the parents to have ESPR.

Parental Responsibility and Confusion

We have a bit of jargon in Australian family law.  It seems to confuse a lot of people.  

The Act uses terms like “live with”, “spend time with” and “parental responsibility”.  In the general parlance, people in Australia are more likely, in my experience, to talk about “custody” and “access”, terms which are outmoded in Australian family law.

In my experience, with both clients and self-represented litigants, the meaning of parental responsibility is not immediately obvious to most non-lawyers.  Clients are often surprised to learn that parental responsibility relates to making decisions about children, but has nothing directly to do with where a child lives or with whom a child spends time (or when, or how often, or how long for).

However, a lot of lay-people seem to have heard or read about the presumption.  They may have googled family law, and read something about it in a Facebook group or forum, or perhaps even stumbled across s 61DA on AustLII and read it without context or an understanding of what the terms meant.

A great many people seem to be under the false impression that this presumption they’ve heard about means that, by default, the Court will order that a child will have equal time with each of their parents.

What’s the effect of repealing it?

To my mind, repealing s 61DA will have little effect on the majority of families.

The existence of the presumption means that there is a default position, and the evidentiary onus falls on the person who wants to deviate from the default.

The absence of the presumption just means that there is no default position.   It doesn’t mean that there is a different default position.  It doesn’t mean that, say, mothers will have sole parental responsibility by default.

It just means that the Court starts with a clean slate, assesses the evidence, and makes a finding as to what allocation of parental responsibility (whether between parents or other adults) is in the child’s best interests.

That is precisely what the Court does now anyway if there is anyone agitating to deviate from equal shared parental responsibility.

I expect that, in the vast majority of families going through separation, both parents will want ESPR, and the Court will continue to order it.

All that changes is that, when there is a dispute about allocation of parental responsibility, there isn’t a party (whether parent or otherwise) who bears a greater evidentiary onus than another party.

In other words, repealing s 61DA would just mean that, when there is a dispute about parental responsibility, each party will be required to adduce evidence in support of their position (which, in practice, happens in most cases already).

My gut reaction

This change will likely affect only a minority of cases before the Court.  In those cases, the outcome may be no different, as the presumption might be rebutted anyway.

The small shift in onus might just ever-so-slightly tip the scales of some power imbalances.  For example, a victim survivor of coercive control may have a slightly less difficult time in escaping further exercise of control by the other party by way of decision-making about a child.

The biggest benefit, to my mind, of repealing s 61DA would be an absence of a widely-held misconception that there is a presumption of equal time.

On balance, I think repealing s 61DA is not a bad idea.

Section 65DAA Repealed

The Bill would repeal s 65DAA.

What is s 65DAA?

Section 65DAA makes it mandatory for the Court to consider certain time arrangements for a child if the Court orders ESPR. 

In particular, where ESPR is ordered, the Court must consider whether an order for equal time is both in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.

If, after considering that option, the Court decides not to order equal time, it must then consider whether an order for the child to spend “substantial and significant time” with each parent is both in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.

It must consider those options even if no party to the proceeding seeks orders for equal time.

All of this is within the existing framework of the Court being required to make parenting Orders which are in the child’s best interests, and s 60CC setting out the factors to be taken into account in determining those best interests.

In other words, s 65DAA says to the Court something like “you must make Orders in the child’s best interests, and s 60CC tells you what to look at, but in exercising your discretion, you must at least think about these particular options, even if nobody is asking for them”.

My gut reaction

I’ve always found s 65DAA a bit weird.

If a party seeks an equal time arrangement, the Court will necessarily consider it.  If nobody seeks equal time, why should the Court spend time and resources considering such an arrangement?

The Court is required to make Orders in the child’s best interests.  

I’m pretty sure that if, after assessing evidence and hearing submissions about an equal-time arrangement, the Court finds that an equal time arrangement is in the child’s best interests, and that it is reasonably practicable, it will order it, whether or not some section of the Act specifically tells the Court to think about that option.

Conversely, if the Court finds that it’s not in the child’s best interests, or that it is not practicable, it won’t order it.  No amount of mandated consideration is going to change that.

The same goes for “substantial and significant time”.

I’m in favour of s 65DAA being repealed.

[1] s 60CC(2)(a): The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents.

s 60CC(3)(b): The nature of the relationship of the child with: (i) each of the child’s parents; and (ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child).

s 60CC(3)(c): The extent to which each of the child’s parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity: (i) to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and (ii) to spend time with the child; and (iii) to communicate with the child.

s 60CC(3)(d): The likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstance, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from: (i) either of his or her parents; or (ii) any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living.

[2] s 60CC(2)(b): The need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence

s 60CC(3)(j): Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family.

s 60CC(3)(k):  If a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child’s family-any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order.

[3] s 60CC(3)(a): Any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the Court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views.

[4] s 60CC(3)(c): Extent to which each parent has taken, or failed to take, opportunities to participate in decision-making about, spend time with, and communicate with the child.

s 60CC(3)(f): The capacity of: (i) each of the child’s parents; and (ii) any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child); to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs.

s 60CC(3)(ca): The extent to which each of the child’s parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent’s obligations to maintain the child.

s 60CC(3)(i): The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents

[5] s 60CC(3)(l).

This content is for general information only, and does not constitute legal advice. Your use of this site does not create a barrister-solicitor or barrister-client relationship.

If you require legal advice, you should engage a suitably qualified solicitor with expertise in the relevant area of law.

Liability limited by a scheme approved
under Professional Standards Legislation.

Doyle's Guide - Recommended

© 2026 Johannes Schmidt

Theme by Anders Noren — Up ↑