Jacky Campbell and I recorded an hour-long fireside chat for TEN about the proposed amendments to the Family Law Act 1975. Check it out below.
Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 – Initial Thoughts on proposed amendments to sections 60CC, 61DA and 65DAA
The Federal Government has published an Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (“Bill”).
If enacted, the Bill would, amongst other things, significantly amend section 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (“Act”) (which section sets out the factors which the Court is required to consider when determining the best interests of a child).
The Bill would also repeal s 61DA (the presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for both of their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility), and section 65DAA (the requirement to consider making an order for equal time or substantial and significant time when the Court makes an order for equal shared parental responsibility).
Whilst I have not had time to fully consider those aspects of the Bill, I have spent a bit of time reading them and comparing them to what they would amend.
I have not yet taken the time to read the other parts of the Bill.
Section 60CC Amendments
Section 60CC sets out the factors which a Court must consider when determining the best interests of a child.
What does it say now?
In its current form, section 60CC is unwieldy.
It contains two “primary considerations” and 14 “additional considerations” (including a catch-all factor which allows the Court to take into consideration whatever it considers appropriate), many of which overlap, many of which are not applicable to many families, but all of which the Court must consider when determining what Orders are in a child’s best interests.
One of the factors applies only if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child: the child’s right to enjoy their Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture, and the impact of any proposed parenting order on that right. It is the 9th factor in the list of the 14 “additional considerations”.
Due to the overlap between many of them, I routinely group the section 60CC factors when making submissions in Court as follows:
- the child’s relationships (4 overlapping factors);
- the risk of harm (3 overlapping factors);
- the child’s views;
- parental capacity, responsibility and involvement (4 overlapping factors); and
- orders least likely to lead to further proceedings.
I note that the above list does not include the factor which applies only if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child. For whatever reasons, I have worked on very few matters where this factor was relevant, so it is not something I deal with routinely.
I have worked exclusively in family law for over 11 years (about half that time as a solicitor, and the other half as a barrister). I find it better and easier to simplify the many factors into 5 essential categories (and, if I recall correctly, I lifted those categories from a judgment many years ago, so I am not the only one who does this).
I can only imagine how difficult it must be for self-represented litigants to understand, and engage with, s 60CC in its current form.
What would the Bill change?
The Bill would dramatically simplify s 60CC, with only 6 factors applying to all children.
The existing factor which applies only if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child remains in place, but is set out separately from the other factors, which will make it easier to find (and its existence more obvious) for cases where it’s relevant, and which will make it easier to skip where it doesn’t apply.
The generally applicable factors are:
- what arrangements would best promote the safety of the child and each carer of the child;
- the child’s views;
- the developmental, psychological and emotional needs of the child;
- the capacity of each proposed carer to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological and emotional needs, with particular regard to the willingness of the carer to seek assistance and support in relation to those matters;
- the benefit to the child of maintaining relationships with both parents, and other people significant to the child where it is safe to do so; and
- a catch-all.
Almost all of the existing factors are essentially covered (with the notable exception of a requirement in the Bill to expressly consider making orders least likely to lead to further proceedings), but the proposed wording is far simpler and more accessible.
There appears to be an increased focus on safety, but, in my opinion, the change is marginal. The existing section already requires the Court, when weighing the two “primary considerations”, to give greater weight to the need to protect a child from harm than to the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with each parent. Same concept, different language.
My gut reaction
In essence, the approach to determining best interests would remain much the same, but the section would become much easier and simpler to understand and apply.
Given the horrific rate of family violence in Australia, any increase in focus on the safety of children and the adults in their lives (however small it may be) can only be a good thing.
On balance, these amendments seem pretty good to me.
Section 61DA Repealed
The Bill would repeal s 61DA.
What is s 61DA?
Section 61DA provides that, when making a parenting order, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for the parents of the child to have equal shared parental responsibility (“ESPR”).
The presumption does not apply when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent, or another person who lives with that parent, has committed child abuse or family violence.
The presumption can, in any case, be rebutted by evidence which satisfies the Court that it would not be in the child’s best interests for the parents to have ESPR.
Parental Responsibility and Confusion
We have a bit of jargon in Australian family law. It seems to confuse a lot of people.
The Act uses terms like “live with”, “spend time with” and “parental responsibility”. In the general parlance, people in Australia are more likely, in my experience, to talk about “custody” and “access”, terms which are outmoded in Australian family law.
In my experience, with both clients and self-represented litigants, the meaning of parental responsibility is not immediately obvious to most non-lawyers. Clients are often surprised to learn that parental responsibility relates to making decisions about children, but has nothing directly to do with where a child lives or with whom a child spends time (or when, or how often, or how long for).
However, a lot of lay-people seem to have heard or read about the presumption. They may have googled family law, and read something about it in a Facebook group or forum, or perhaps even stumbled across s 61DA on AustLII and read it without context or an understanding of what the terms meant.
A great many people seem to be under the false impression that this presumption they’ve heard about means that, by default, the Court will order that a child will have equal time with each of their parents.
What’s the effect of repealing it?
To my mind, repealing s 61DA will have little effect on the majority of families.
The existence of the presumption means that there is a default position, and the evidentiary onus falls on the person who wants to deviate from the default.
The absence of the presumption just means that there is no default position. It doesn’t mean that there is a different default position. It doesn’t mean that, say, mothers will have sole parental responsibility by default.
It just means that the Court starts with a clean slate, assesses the evidence, and makes a finding as to what allocation of parental responsibility (whether between parents or other adults) is in the child’s best interests.
That is precisely what the Court does now anyway if there is anyone agitating to deviate from equal shared parental responsibility.
I expect that, in the vast majority of families going through separation, both parents will want ESPR, and the Court will continue to order it.
All that changes is that, when there is a dispute about allocation of parental responsibility, there isn’t a party (whether parent or otherwise) who bears a greater evidentiary onus than another party.
In other words, repealing s 61DA would just mean that, when there is a dispute about parental responsibility, each party will be required to adduce evidence in support of their position (which, in practice, happens in most cases already).
My gut reaction
This change will likely affect only a minority of cases before the Court. In those cases, the outcome may be no different, as the presumption might be rebutted anyway.
The small shift in onus might just ever-so-slightly tip the scales of some power imbalances. For example, a victim survivor of coercive control may have a slightly less difficult time in escaping further exercise of control by the other party by way of decision-making about a child.
The biggest benefit, to my mind, of repealing s 61DA would be an absence of a widely-held misconception that there is a presumption of equal time.
On balance, I think repealing s 61DA is not a bad idea.
Section 65DAA Repealed
The Bill would repeal s 65DAA.
What is s 65DAA?
Section 65DAA makes it mandatory for the Court to consider certain time arrangements for a child if the Court orders ESPR.
In particular, where ESPR is ordered, the Court must consider whether an order for equal time is both in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.
If, after considering that option, the Court decides not to order equal time, it must then consider whether an order for the child to spend “substantial and significant time” with each parent is both in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.
It must consider those options even if no party to the proceeding seeks orders for equal time.
All of this is within the existing framework of the Court being required to make parenting Orders which are in the child’s best interests, and s 60CC setting out the factors to be taken into account in determining those best interests.
In other words, s 65DAA says to the Court something like “you must make Orders in the child’s best interests, and s 60CC tells you what to look at, but in exercising your discretion, you must at least think about these particular options, even if nobody is asking for them”.
My gut reaction
I’ve always found s 65DAA a bit weird.
If a party seeks an equal time arrangement, the Court will necessarily consider it. If nobody seeks equal time, why should the Court spend time and resources considering such an arrangement?
The Court is required to make Orders in the child’s best interests.
I’m pretty sure that if, after assessing evidence and hearing submissions about an equal-time arrangement, the Court finds that an equal time arrangement is in the child’s best interests, and that it is reasonably practicable, it will order it, whether or not some section of the Act specifically tells the Court to think about that option.
Conversely, if the Court finds that it’s not in the child’s best interests, or that it is not practicable, it won’t order it. No amount of mandated consideration is going to change that.
The same goes for “substantial and significant time”.
I’m in favour of s 65DAA being repealed.
 s 60CC(2)(a): The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents.
s 60CC(3)(b): The nature of the relationship of the child with: (i) each of the child’s parents; and (ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child).
s 60CC(3)(c): The extent to which each of the child’s parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity: (i) to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and (ii) to spend time with the child; and (iii) to communicate with the child.
s 60CC(3)(d): The likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstance, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from: (i) either of his or her parents; or (ii) any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living.
 s 60CC(2)(b): The need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence
s 60CC(3)(j): Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family.
s 60CC(3)(k): If a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child’s family-any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order.
 s 60CC(3)(a): Any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the Court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views.
 s 60CC(3)(c): Extent to which each parent has taken, or failed to take, opportunities to participate in decision-making about, spend time with, and communicate with the child.
s 60CC(3)(f): The capacity of: (i) each of the child’s parents; and (ii) any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child); to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs.
s 60CC(3)(ca): The extent to which each of the child’s parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent’s obligations to maintain the child.
s 60CC(3)(i): The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents
 s 60CC(3)(l).
On 6 October 2021, I presented a CPD session for the Family Law Bar Association, together with Senior Judicial Registrar Parker of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia and Dr Robin Smith of the Victorian Bar, about recent changes to Australia’s family law system.
I shared a few thoughts about the harmonised Family Law Rules. Whilst I did not write a paper per se, I thought that some practitioners may find utility in the notes I used for my presentation, a copy of which you may download, or view below.
A recording of the entire session is available to members of the Victorian Bar on the CPD section of the Bar website, and to others by subscription to CPD In Session.
As part of the Foley’s List Family law 2020 Zoom Sessions, Emma Swart and I presented about a range of ways in which family law final property orders might not be so final after all. You can watch the presentation here.
Update: our presentation was also included in season 2 of the Think Foley’s Podcast. You can listen to the episode here.
Dr Anna Parker and I recently recorded a video CPD presentation to assist solicitors in navigating the COVID-19 version of litigation in Australia. In particular, we discussed electronic brief and electronic hearings, mediations and conferences.
The video runs for just under one hour and, if relevant, may provide 1 CPD point in relation to professional skills.
The Family Court of Australia and Federal Circuit Court of Australia have today issued Joint Practice Direction 1 of 2020, which sets out the “Core Principles in the Case Management of Family Law Matters”.
In essence, nothing in it is new. It repeats, and highlights, certain principles in the Family Law Act 1975, Family Law Rules 2004 and Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.
However, it does suggest that the Courts will be taking some of these principles more seriously than they have been, including costs consequences (including against legal practitioners) where there is non-compliance.
Is this the first real step towards a firmer approach to poor conduct in our jurisdiction, edging towards some of the concepts found in legislation such as the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)?
Read Joint Practice Direction 1 of 2020 (Core Principles in the Case Management of Family Law Matters) on the Family Court of Australia website.
Matters to Which We Don’t Often Turn Our Minds: Section 85A, Costs Applications in Parenting Matters, and Contempt
On 12 June 2019, I presented at the JAM Family Law Conference in Sliema, Malta, my paper entitled Matters to Which We Don’t Often Turn Our Minds: Section 85A of the Family Law Act, Costs Applications in Parenting Matters, and Contempt in Family Law.
I presented this paper on 10 August 2017 at the Foley’s List Family Law Breakfast.
Section 85A of the Family Law Act 1975 (“Act”) permits the Court to make Orders adjusting property which falls within a settlement made in relation to a marriage. Crucially, this means that the Court has power to adjust property interests which are outside the matrimonial property pool available for adjustment under s 79 of the Act, provided that the facts of the case fit within s 85A(1).
The section provides as follows:
85A Ante‑nuptial and post‑nuptial settlements
(1) The court may, in proceedings under this Act, make such order as the court considers just and equitable with respect to the application, for the benefit of all or any of the parties to, and the children of, the marriage, of the whole or part of property dealt with by ante‑nuptial or post‑nuptial settlements made in relation to the marriage.
(2) In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (1), the court shall take into account the matters referred to in subsection 79(4) so far as they are relevant.
(3) A court cannot make an order under this section in respect of matters that are included in a financial agreement.
There is limited case law in relation to s 85A.
In this paper, I rely heavily on the first-instance judgment of Cronin J in Rice. I was the solicitor for the applicant wife in that case. To the best of my knowledge following extensive research (both in preparing the wife’s case in Rice for trial, and again in preparing this paper), there is no earlier reported case in which an application under s 85A was successful, and only a handful of cases where the section was discussed at all. Rice is particularly interesting because it relates in its entirety to s 85A, as the matrimonial property pool was virtually non-existent.
In Rice, Cronin J found that s 85A “is intended to make certain property subject to the orders that could be made under s 79.”
Unlike s 106B of the Act, s 85A is not directed at ill-intended transactions. There is no requirement of an intention to defeat a claim. So much is clear from the wording of the section. Cronin J confirmed in Rice that s 85A is not restricted to being “a vehicle to claw back assets which had been put beyond the power of the Court”.
His Honour held that
“the fundamental question is whether or not parties other than the husband and wife are holding assets which, by virtue of [the subject settlement], the assets [sic] have been put beyond the reach of the Court to such an extent that the Court cannot do justice.”
No De Facto Equivalent
There is no corresponding section in Part VIIIAB of the Act. There is, therefore, no relief of the kind available under s 85A with respect to de facto financial causes.
How s 85A Works
The section does not confer an independent power upon the Court, but rather an ancillary power to another matrimonial cause. In other words, there must be some head of power to which the application of s 85A may attach. So much is obvious from the words “in proceedings under this Act” in s 85A(1).
Requirements to Fall within s 85A
The remainder of s 85A(1) may be broken into the following elements:
- The Court may make an order for the application of the subject property for the benefit of the parties to the marriage, or their children. This is consistent with the Court’s power to adjust property within the matrimonial pool for the benefit of the parties’ children, as well as for the benefit of the parties.
- The subject property must have been dealt with by an ante-nuptial of post-nuptial settlement. I discuss what constitutes a “settlement” below.
- The settlement in question must have been “made in relation to the marriage”. I discuss this below.
- Any order which the Court makes under s 85A must be just and equitable. These are the concepts of justice and equity with which we are all familiar.
How s 85A is Applied
Cronin J, in Rice, summarised the effect of s 85A(2) as follows:
“If the facts do fit within s 85A, the provision is remedial and Part VIII of the Act applies rather than any other determination according to equitable principles.”
In that case, the property in question (several parcels of farm land, on one of which stood the family home) had been transferred to two of the parties’ adult children, who had been joined to the proceedings, with certain rights (including a right of occupation for life) reserved to the parties.
His Honour agreed with the submissions made on behalf of the applicant wife that, if the Court found that there was a nuptial settlement in relation to the marriage in satisfaction of s 85A(1), s 85A(2) required that the matter effectively be treated as a s 79 matter as between all four parties.
No Circumvention of Financial Agreements
The meaning of s 85A(3) is self-evident: s 85A cannot be used to circumvent the ousting of the Court’s jurisdiction by a financial agreement.
A Settlement in Relation to the Marriage
In Rice, Cronin J observed that a “nuptial settlement has to create a right, property or interest for at least [one of the parties to the marriage] if s 85A … is to be applied.” Where “assets originally held by one of the parties to the marriage have been transferred to another person by way of an absolute gift, there is no basis to suggest that there was a settlement.”
“Settlement” is not a well-defined term. Cronin J discussed its meaning at length in Rice. The following are some of the matters which his Honour considered:
- The definition of “settlement” found in the Settled Land Act 1958 (Vic)
“includes inter alia, an agreement under which or by virtue of which instrument, any land is charged, whether voluntarily or by way of family arrangement for the benefit of other persons.”
- In Gill, a case involving construction of a will, Harvey J found that a personal obligation on a beneficiary to provide board for the deceased’s daughters was capable of attracting the intervention of equity. Cronin J concluded that “Equity will intervene if a settlement requires that intervention.”
- Referring to the English decision of Re Brace, Cronin J indicated that a merely precatory condition to provide a benefit would not be enough to constitute a settlement.
- Cronin J referred Burke v Dawes, where Dixon J endorsed the word “tenancy” being interpreted “as ordinarily understood arising out of an agreement under which the person in possession was allowed to occupy in consideration of some kind of rent.”
- His Honour found that the “right of occupation for life” retained by the wife in Rice “gives rise to an equitable interest under the settlement between all of the parties.”
- It did not matter that the wife’s right to remain living on the property was inalienable. Cronin J found that there “was a quasi-contract which created an interest in the land for the wife and the husband despite the transfer of the legal title.” His Honour contemplated whether the daughters could have sold the property while the husband and wife lived there, and reached the view that they could not.
- His Honour noted that many authorities “confirm that the question is whether the registered proprietor’s powers of alienation, devising and transmission are restrained by the limitations of the settlement.” (My emphasis.) The key element is that the legal owner’s power to deal with the subject property is fettered in some way. If the transfer to the legal owner was absolute, there is not settlement for the purposes of s 85A.
In Relation to the Marriage
Section 85A was discussed in Kennon v Spry, in separate judgments, by Heydon J and Kiefel J (as her Honour then was). The other Justices did not consider it necessary to discuss s 85A in any detail.
Heydon J found that the words “made in relation to the marriage” in s 85A(1) could not apply to a trust which was settled 10 years before the parties’ marriage.
Kiefel J found that a settlement made in relation to the marriage might involve:
“A disposition of property for the purposes of regulating the enjoyment of settlement property … [but] it is necessary that it provide for the financial benefit of one or other of the spouses. It may imply some kind of continuing provision for them.”
In Anison, Hogan J summarised what her Honour apparently considered to be the most important elements of Kiefel J’s reasoning in Kennon v Spry with respect to the words “in relation to the marriage” in s 85A(1), as follows:
“a) s 85A (1) was intended to have a wide operation to property held for the benefit of the parties on a settlement and to which they have contributed and it is intended to apply to settlements whether they occur before or during marriage; and
b) the essential requirement of the section is that there be a sufficient association between the property the subject of a settlement and the marriage the subject of proceedings; and
c) s 85A (1) does not require that a settlement made prior to marriage be directed to the particular marriage at the point it is made and it is sufficient for the purposes of the section that the association of which it speaks (“made in relation to”) be present when the Court comes to determine the application of the property settled under s 85A (1).”
Whilst Kiefel J was part of a majority with respect to the balance of the appeal in Kennon v Spry, there was no majority view with respect to s 85A. The question of whether a settlement which pre-dates the marriage can be a settlement “in relation to the marriage” remains unsettled.
Rice sheds no light on this, as the settlement in that case was made some 30 years after the parties married.
Where Might s 85A Apply?
The dearth of reported s 85A cases means that there are almost no examples of scenarios which clearly fall within the section.
On the other hand, s 85A is a potentially powerful weapon in the family lawyer’s armoury, which may be used to access property outside the pool as we know it.
I expect that the most common potential application of s 85A may be in relation to trust property which cannot be said to be the property of a party in the usual application of s 79.
However, it is clear from Rice that the term “settlement” encompasses more than a formally established trust. The settlement in that case was a “quasi-contract” which arose primarily out conversations between the husband, the wife and the daughters.
I have no answers beyond the Rice scenario, but, to my mind, the following questions are interesting:
- Where the husband and wife place property in a trust of which their children are the corpus beneficiaries, but the husband and wife are income beneficiaries only, would that trust constitute a settlement for the purposes of s 85A?
- In the following scenario, is the trust a settlement in relation to the marriage? Is the home subject to adjustment under s 85A?
- The matrimonial home, originally bought for the parties as a wedding gift by the wife’s parents, is subject to a mortgagee sale after the husband’s business venture fails.
- The wife’s mother establishes a family trust of which the parties’ children, but not the parties, are the beneficiaries. The wife’s mother funds the acquisition of the home by the new trust from the mortgagee to enable the family to continue to live there, but to protect it from further risk associated with the husband’s future ventures.
- The wife’s mother is the appointor of the trust. There is a corporate trustee, of which the wife and the wife’s mother are the directors and shareholders.
- The family continues to live in the home for the remainder of the marriage.
- At the time of trial:
- the husband and wife are the directors and shareholders of the corporate trustee;
- the wife is the substituted appointor of the trust; and
- the wife continues to live in the home with the adult children.
Perhaps, some 34 years after s 85A was inserted into the Act, its time to shine will finally arrive.
 Rice v Rice (2015) 52 Fam LR 618 (“Rice”).
 Rice at .
 Rice at .
 Greval v Estate of the late Greval; Sandalwood Lodge Pty Ltd (Intervener) (1990) FLC ¶92-132.
 Act s 79(1)(d).
 Rice at .
 See, generally, Rice at  – .
 Rice at .
 Rice at .
 See, generally, Rice at  – .
 Rice at .
 Gill v Gill (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 400.
 Rice at  – .
 Rice at .
 Burke v Dawes (1938) 59 CLR 1.
 Rice at .
 Rice at .
 Rice at .
 Kennon v Spry (2008) 238 CLR 366 (“Kennon v Spry”).
 Kennon v Spry at 437, as set out in Rice at .
 Anison & Anison and Anor  FamCA 973 (“Anison”).
 Anison at .
 From a real case. The wife contended that the home was outside the pool. The husband contended that the home was in the pool, but did not plead s 85A, and had not joined the children to the proceedings. The children went on affidavit to assert their rights under the trust. The matter ultimately settled on the morning of the first day of the trial.
Download this Case Note as a PDF
In Wallis & Manning, the Full Court of the Family Court (comprised of Thackray, Ainslie-Wallace and Murphy JJ) held that whilst
“no two cases are precisely the same … comparable cases can, and perhaps should far more often, be used so as to inform, relevantly, the assessment of contributions within s 79 [of the Family Law Act 1975 (“FLA”)].”
This was an appeal from a judgment of Judge Demack of the Federal Circuit Court delivered on 29 September 2015, three years after her Honour heard the matter. This case note relates only to the Full Court’s reasons as to the third ground of appeal, particularly in relation to the appellant’s contention of discretionary error with respect to the Trial Judge’s assessment of the parties’ contributions. Consequently, the facts of the case have no bearing, and I will not set them out.
Their Honours drew a parallel between the exercise of the discretion in assessing contributions in property matters under the FLA and sentencing discretion in criminal matters, noting that, in both, Counsel commonly refer to the “available range”.
The Full Court considered the High Court’s judgment in Barbaro, where
“the plurality … [pointed] out that specifying a ‘range’ for the exercise of the relevant discretion does not inform as to which ‘facts and factors’ have been taken into account in arriving at the submitted ‘range’.”
It found that
“what the plurality said in Barbaro of the sentencing discretion is what can and should be said of assertions as to ‘the range’ … in the exercise of the relevant discretions under s 79.”
The Full Court noted the joint judgment of Mason CJ and Dean J in Norbis, where their Honours said
“To avoid the risk of inconsistency and arbitrariness … the Full Court … should give guidance as to the manner in which these [discretionary] assessments and judgments are to be made … in a way that preserves … the capacity of the Family Court to do justice according the needs of the individual case.”
The Full Court in Manning & Wallis considered the earlier Full Court decision in G v G, and High Court decision in Mallet, which, respectively, supported the proposition that the discretion ought to be guided “by a process of careful analysis and comparison of like cases” and that “shared experience and accumulated expertize [sic] should lead to the emergence of generally accepted concepts of what is … just and appropriate”.
It contrasted that position with subsequent Full Court decisions in Petruski, Daymond, and Claughton.
In Petruski, the Full Court, faced with submissions that departure from results in various first-instance decisions with respect to “short marriages” resulted in a “plainly wrong” decision by the Trial Judge, “[considered] such an exercise to be unhelpful.”
The Full Court in Daymond held that
“there is no necessary basis for the overall assessment of contributions, for example, in one case, to be decided in the same way as in other cases, simply because there may be a broad similarity between the facts of those cases.”
In Claughton, Strickland J said that “the Full Court on at least two occasions decried” the use of comparable cases, referring to Petruski and Fields & Smith.
The Full Court in Manning & Wallis agreed with those judgments to the extent that “in a guided but otherwise unfettered discretion the result in another case … cannot determine the result in the case under consideration.” However, their Honours found that Strickland J’s view that “any comparison with those cases is ‘unhelpful’ … is … inconsistent with both High Court … and … Full Court authority”.
Their Honours reiterated that “the judgment of the plurality in Barbaro … provides … powerful guidance in respect of the use of comparable cases for the exercise of the s 79 discretion.”
As set out at the top of this case note, their Honours ultimately held that
“comparable cases can, and perhaps should far more often, be used so as to inform, relevantly, the assessment of contributions within s 79”
Their Honours went on to say that
“The word ‘comparable’ is used advisedly. The search is not for ‘some sort of tariff let alone an appropriate upper and lower end of the range of orders which may be made’. Nor is it a search for the ‘right’ or ‘correct’ result: the very wide discretion … is antithetical to both. The search is for comparability – for ‘what has been done in other (more or less) comparable cases’ – with consistency as its aim.”
Their Honours, referring to submissions made regarding allegedly comparable cases, noted that
“while the facts of each of those cases were … listed in the submissions, there were no submissions which sought to compare the facts there with the case under consideration. …
No argument was made to her Honour as to any consistency emerging from those authorities, nor is there any attempt to canvass a number of different authorities … so as to seek to establish any such comparability.”
This highlights the importance of not merely summarising comparable cases, but clearly setting out how, and why, the facts of earlier cases are similar to the case at hand, and identifying any consistency emerging from those earlier cases.
 Wallis & Manning (2017) FLC ¶93-759.
 At .
 Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58.
 Wallis & Manning at .
 Wallis & Manning at .
 Norbis & Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513.
 Norbis at 519-520 cited in Wallis & Manning at .
 G v G  FamCA 1453.
 Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605.
 G v G cited in Wallis & Manning at  (emphasis in original).
 Mallet cited in Wallis & Manning at  (emphasis in original).
 Petruski & Balewa (2013) 49 Fam LR 116.
 Daymond & Daymond  FamCAFC 212.
 Claughton & Northey  FamCAFC 213.
 Cited in Wallis & Manning at .
 Daymond at , cited in Wallis & Manning at  (emphasis in original).
 Cited in Wallis & Manning at .
 Fields & Smith (2015) FLC ¶93-638.
 At  (emphasis in original).
 At .
 At .
 At .
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On 4 May 2017, Debra Cherrie and I presented to a group of around 35 lawyers at Arnold Bloch Leibler on the fundamentals of family law financial matters, and how family law intersects with commercial law.
The topics covered included:
- Spousal Maintenance
- Property Settlements
- Requirement for Justice & Equity
- What Constitutes Property under the Family Law Act 1975
- Treatment of Trust Interests
- Treatment of Potential Inheritances
- When the Court Can Make Orders
- De Facto Relationships
- Ousting Jurisdiction
- Intersections with Commercial Law
- Taxation and Duty
- Corporate Issues
- Contractual and Equitable Principles
- Inheritance Entitlements
- Asset Planning
- Financial Agreements
- Orders in an Intact Marriage
Download the slides: Family Law: Fundamentals and Intersections with Commercial Law